

SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) *

Proposed SECOM Response to DCI Request

FROM:

C/DCI SECOM
5E-25 CIA HQS

EXTENSION

NO.

SECOM-D-245

DATE

7 December 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. ICS Registry

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-245

7 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Proposed SECOM Response to DCI Request

25X1

1. Attached for your approval is a proposed response to the DCI's 28 November 1983 memorandum, requesting additional information about SECOM's status report to him.

25X1

2. The DCI's offer to weigh in on the leak problem is gratifying, but the risk at this time of unfavorable publicity seems to outweigh the likelihood of positive results.

25X1

3. The request for the comparison of PD-24 and the proposed NSDD on communications and computer security probably can be fulfilled best by providing the IC Staff's 28 October 1983 input to the DDCI. Subject to your approval, I have included that document as an attachment to the SECOM response.

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Attachment

25X1

Regraded CONFIDENTIAL When
Separated from Attachment

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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25X1

SUBJECT: Proposed SECOM Response to DCI Request

Distribution:

- 1 - Addressee w/att
- ① - ICS Registry w/att
- 1 - SECOM Subj w/att
- 1 - SECOM Chrono w/att

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-243

7 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Director, Intelligence Community Staff *ERB* DEC 1983

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Security Committee Activities [Redacted]

25X1

REFERENCE: DCI Memorandum to C/SECOM, dated 28 November 1983

1. In your response (Reference) to the Security Committee's recent status report, you asked (a) how prior DCI's have weighed in on the leak problem and (b) to see the comparison of PD-24 and the proposed NSDD on communications and computer security. [Redacted]

25X1

2. Regarding leaks, you have exceeded by a considerable margin the efforts of the other DCI's to weigh in on the problem. The videotape you made in June is being shown around the Community and is being favorably received. Because of severe current press criticism of Administration anti-leak efforts, it is unlikely that putting the DCI's prestige on the line at this time would serve a useful purpose. Your continued support of FBI investigation of specific leaks, however, could bring positive results. [Redacted]

25X1

3. The effort to replace PD-24 with a single NSDD covering both communications and computer security has been overtaken by events. The IC Staff input to the DDCI on this matter, including the SECOM comparison you requested, is attached. A draft replacement for PD-24, concerning only COMSEC, has been prepared and is being reviewed in the Community. [Redacted]

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4. Please advise if further information is desired. [Redacted]

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Attachment

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SUBJECT: Security Committee Activities

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Distribution:

Orig - Addressee w/att

1 - DDCI w/att

2 - ER w/att

1 - D/ICS w/att

① - ICS Registry w/att

SECRET

DCI/ICS 83-4044
28 October 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Concern Relating to the Proposed Revision
of PD/NSC-24

1. A proposed revision to PD/NSC-24 (Telecommunications Protection Policy) has been formulated by Ken deGraffenreid of the NSC and selected members of the National Communications Security Committee (NCSC). The revision is based on the findings of the Countermeasures Organization Study produced under the auspices of the Senior Interagency Group (Intelligence) in July 1983 in response to NSSD-2. Under this revision, PD/NSC-24 will be entitled "National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security"--a significant expansion in the scope of activities covered. This memorandum highlights the concerns and comments expressed by the IC Staff, CIA/OC, and CIA/OGC regarding the proposed revision. Attachments 1, 2, and 3 (which were developed by the DCI's Security Committee, CIA/OC, and CIA/OGC, respectively) provide comparisons of the proposed NSDD with the present PD-24. [REDACTED]

2. All parties are agreed that there is a need for national policies for the protection of telecommunications and automated information systems. The proposed revision would establish a single national policy and management structure covering both disciplines. Although there is philosophical agreement that separate policies might leave gaps in the protection of information as the technologies of the two disciplines converge, concerns were raised over the feasibility of managing a consolidated effort, particularly in view of the expanded scope of the systems addressed in the current proposal.

3. The proposed NSDD identifies the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent of the Government for Telecommunications and Automated Systems Security. There is some concern within the IC Staff and CIA/OC over the appropriateness of having the Secretary in this role because the proposed NSDD expands security to include information affecting privacy of US persons. Several other related concerns are identified in the attachments. [REDACTED]

4. There is unanimous concern that the proposed NSDD does not accurately recognize the DCI's statutory responsibilities and authorities. Several actions in particular in the proposed NSDD could severely impact the DCI's ability to carry out his responsibilities. These include:

This memo is downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL
upon removal of attachments.

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9. It is recommended that:

- o an official DCI response to this proposed NSDD be developed by the IC Staff in coordination with CIA/OGC, CIA/OS/ISSG, and CIA/OC;
- o the existing policies promulgated under the NCSC remain in effect until the draft NSDD has been revised to address the concerns stated in this memorandum;
- o the new draft NSDD be properly staffed with the agencies under the existing NCSC; and
- o that progress be deliberate so as to allow incorporation of the results of the DCI's Computer Security Project. ☐

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Attachments: a/s

**SUBJECT: Concern Relating to the Proposed Revision
of PD/NSC-24**

Distribution:

Orig - DDCI

- 1 - Executive Registry**
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- 1 - D/OS**
- 1 - SECOM**
- 1 - D/ICS**
- 1 - D/PPS**
- 1 - ICS Registry**
- 1 - IHC Subject (LGS)**
- 1 - IHC Chrono**

ICS/IHC/ **(28 Oct 83)**

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS		X		
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OLL				
16	C/PAO				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	C/SECOM	X			
21	ES		X		
22					
SUSPENSE		8 Dec			

Remarks

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Executive Secretary
28 November 1983
Date

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NOV 1983

28 November 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

1. Thanks for your response to my request for concise information about what the committee is doing, how well it is doing, and how it might do better.
2. The committee seems to have taken on an impressive array of assignments. I share its frustration at not getting more cooperation and more results on leaks and uniform protection of intelligence. It might help if I had a review of how and when prior DCIs have weighed in effectively to read the riot act and otherwise curb laxity in the handling of classified information. Has anybody ever had any success at this?
3. I am expecting a briefing on computer security this week.
4. Let me see the comparison of the proposed NSDD on "Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security" with the current environment governed by PD-24 and the areas in which the proposed NSDD would have impact on the DCI's statutory and executive order authorities for the protection of sources and methods.


William J. Casey

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